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Top leasing,' whereby a lessee acquires a lease on a mineral estate cur-
rently under a valid, existing lease, is not a new phenomenon in the oil and
gas industry. The legal issues surrounding top leasing have been the subject
of reported cases for more than fifty years.
It has been during the last decade, however, that the practice of top
leasing for oil and gas has increased dramatically. During the late 1970's,
highly competitive leasing areas such as the Williston Basin in North Dakota
and Montana became fertile ground for this proliferation of top leasing.
The major factors that combined to spur the growth of top leasing in those
areas include the shortage of drilling rigs, an increasing number of brokers
and independent oil and gas exploration companies hungry for leasehold
positions and, perhaps, increasingly sophisticated mineral owners. Ethical
and moral concerns regarding the practice of top leasing, which led one
court in 1960 to state that "[t]op leasing has the same invidious characteris-
tics as claim jumping,"'2 have seemingly ebbed in the face of strident compe-
tition for leasehold positions.
Although courts in many jurisdictions have upheld the validity of a
properly drafted top lease, concerns regarding the legal ramifications of the
art and practice of top leasing for oil and gas persist. The aim of this article
is to outline those concerns in an understandable manner and offer a few
suggestions as to how an oil and gas company engaged in top leasing might
be able to avoid litigation.
I. DEFINITION OF A Top LEASE
A top lease is an oil and gas lease covering a mineral estate that is cur-
rently under a valid, existing oil and gas lease. The top lease has been de-
scribed as a "partial alienation of a possibility of reverter"3 and as a "present
grant of a future interest."14 In oil and gas terms, the prior lease is frequently
referred to as the "bottom lease." In most cases, the bottom lease will still be
within its primary term when the top lease is executed. However, when a
* Copyright 0 1982 by J. Hovey Kemp.
** Attorney at law, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado. B.A., 1976, Harvard
University; J.D., 1980, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. For other legal periodical articles on this subject, see Brown, E.ect of Top Leases: Ob-
struction of Tile and Related Considerations, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 213 (1978); Ernest, Top Leasing-
Legality v. Morally, 26 ROcKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 957 (1980).
2. Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436, 445 n.23 (10th Cir. 1960).
3. Brown, supra note 1, at 239.
4. Barnett v. Getty Oil Co., 266 So. 2d 581, 585 (Miss. 1972).
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mineral estate is burdened by an oil and gas lease in its secondary term (for
example, where the lessee has established production from the leased lands,
or from lands with which the leased lands have been pooled or unitized,
prior to expiration of the primary term), a second lease that is executed
before the prior lease expires can be properly classified as a "top lease" as
well.
In general, there are two basic types of top leases. First, a two-party top
leasing situation can be described as follows: B (lessee) owns an oil and gas
lease covering the mineral estate of A (lessor). The lease is dated January 1,
1972, with a primary term of ten years and so long thereafter as oil or gas is
produced. Some months before the primary term of his lease expires, B
secures another lease from A, dated September 1, 1981, but with a primary
term of ten years commencing January 1, 1982 (the day after B's prior lease
expires). 5 B might top lease his own bottom lease for a variety of reasons.
Drilling rigs may be scarce in the last year of the bottom lease's primary
term, threatening B's ability to extend the lease into a secondary term. More
likely, B may be concerned that he will lose his leasehold position if he
doesn't get to A before his competitors arrive, armed with offers of an in-
creased bonus and a greater landowner's royalty.
The second basic type of top lease involves a three-party situation,
which can be pictured as follows: The owner of the mineral estate, A (les-
sor), leases to B (lessee), by an oil and gas lease dated January 1, 1972, with a
primary term of ten years and so long thereafer as oil or gas is produced.
Some months before the primary term of B's lease expires, C, a third party,
secures another lease from A covering the same lands, dated September 1,
1981, but with a primary term of ten years from January 1, 1982 (the day
after the primary term of the prior lease expires). 6 C may have been able to
secure his top lease with an offer of an increased royalty, promises of immi-
nent drilling operations, and payment of a portion of the bonus considera-
tion at signing, the remainder to be paid if the top lease actually takes effect
upon expiration of the bottom lease.
7
II. APPROACHES TO Top LEASE LITIGATION
Top leases come under the scrutiny of courts most frequently in disputes
between the bottom lessee and the top lessee over the exclusive possession of
5. The two-party top lease diagrammed above should be distinguished from the situation
where B's top lease is not subject to B's bottom lease (that is, where B's top lease is dated and
"effective" September 1, 1981, and makes no mention of his prior lease). If B is wise, he will
avoid any overlap of the two leases, thereby avoiding questions of which lease terms apply if
there is production during the overlap period. For a thorough discussion of the applicability of
the doctrine of "novation," as applied to the two-party top lease situation, see Brown, supra note
1, at 231-37.
6. The three-party lease pictured above should be distinguished from the situation where
C's top lease is not subject to the rights of B under the bottom lease (that is, where C's top lease
is dated and effective September 1, 1981, and makes no mention of B's prior lease). As discussed
in the text, C will avoid creating any such overlap of the two leases while B's lease is still in
effect, thereby steering clear of some of the legal pitfalls described herein.
7. One method by which a bottom lessee could have an option to prevent his lease from
being top leased by a third party would be for him to include in his bottom lease a preferential
right to purchase a top lease on the same terms as any top lease offer that the lessor receives.
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the leasehold estate. Resolution of these disputes generally turns on the issue
of whether the bottom lease has expired or whether it has been extended.
The litigation is usually in the form of a quiet title action by either the top
lessee or the bottom lessee. Sometimes, however, a lessor who has executed a
top lease will sue on his own or will join in an action with the top lessee to
cancel the bottom lease. Ultimately, however, the central question to be
determined by the court is the same: Whose lease is valid?
When the litigation is instigated by the top lessee, he will generally
claim that his top lease is the only valid lease covering the subject mineral
estate and will ask the court to quiet his title or, perhaps, he may request
that the court find the bottom lessee in trespass. In general, when the bot-
tom lessee brings such an action he will typically assert that his bottom lease
is still valid, and will request 1) that the court quiet his title to the exclusion
of the top lessee or 2) that the court find the top lessee in trespass. If the facts
warrant, the bottom lessee may also sue his lessor, claiming that the lessor
has obstructed or otherwise interfered with his rights under his bottom lease
by executing the top lease.
State courts in Kentucky,8 Louisiana,9 Mississippi, 1° Montana," Ne-
braska, 12 North Dakota, 13 Oklahoma, 14 and Texas,' 5 and several federal
courts have considered such claims.' 6 It should be noted that most cases
involving top leases do not turn on the validity or invalidity of top leasing.
Because courts generally have accepted the proposition that a properly
drafted top lease creates a valid interest in favor of the top lessee, the bulk of
the discussion below examines those cases that are concerned with the more
problematic legal aspects of top leasing for oil and gas.
A. Recognition of the Top Lease
In 1923, in Rorex v. Karcher' 7 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a
8. See, e.g., Joyce v. Zachary, 434 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1968); Wheeler & LeMaster Oil & Gas
Co. v. Henley, 398 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1965); Lebow v. Cameron, 394 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1965);
Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (1934); Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Gillam,
212 Ky. 293, 279 S.W. 626 (1926).
9. See, e.g., Prentice v. Amax Petroleum Corp., 220 So. 2d 783 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
10. See, e.g., Barnett v. Getty Oil Co., 266 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1972); Lone Star Producing
Co. v. Walker, 257 So. 2d 496 (Miss. 1971).
11. See, e.g., Christian v. A.A. Oil Corp., 161 Mont. 420, 506 P.2d 1369 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Willan v. Farrar, 176 Neb. 1, 124 N.W.2d 699 (1963).
13. See, e.g., Norman Jessen & Assocs. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 305 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1981).
14. See, e.g., Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954); Jennings v. Elliott, 186 Okla. 285,
97 P.2d 67 (1939); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 121 Okla. 135, 248 P. 329 (1926); Rorex v. Karcher,
101 Okla. 195, 224 P. 696 (1923).
15. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 594 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); At-
lantic Richfield Co. v. Hilton, 437 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Milburn v. Yates, 430
S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Matthews v. Sun Oil Co., 425 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1968); Shell
Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). For a discussion of Texas decisions
involving top leases, see Brown, supra note 1, at 228-31.
16. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Exeter Expl'n Co., 671 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1982); Superior Oil Co.
v. Devon Corp., 604 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1979); Cox v. Gulf Oil Corp., 301 F.2d 122 (loth Cir.
1962); Muth v. Aetna Oil Co., 188 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1951); Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v.
Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Robinson v. Continental Oil Co., 255 F. Supp.
61 (D. Kan. 1966).
17. 101 Okla. 195, 224 P. 696 (1923).
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top lease is valid. Plaintiff, the top lessee, acquired a top lease from the
mineral owners while a valid oil and gas lease already covered the lessors'
lands. Roughly a month before the prior lease was to expire, the lessors
executed an extension agreement with defendants, the prior lessees, to ex-
tend the prior lease. The prior lessees then commenced drilling some three
months after the primary term of their lease expired. Plaintiffs sued when
the defendants refused to stop drilling. During the trial, the defendants
called into question the validity of the top lease. In reviewing the trial
court's decision for defendants, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is the contention of the defendants that the lease to the plain-
tiff, having been executed while there was a valid lease on the
property, was void. No authority is cited to sustain this proposi-
tion, and we have been unable to find any which tends to support
the same. The lessors were the owners of the fee-simple title to the
property, and the same was not restricted in any manner whatever.
Such being the condition of the title, there was no reason why the
owners of the fee could not carve out as many estates as they saw
fit. There was no reason why the [lessors] could not execute a sec-
ond oil and gas lease during the existence of the first lease. Of
course, the holders of the second lease would take same subject to
the rights of the holders of the first lease . . . . We are therefore of
the opinion that the lease to the plaintiff was valid, and that judg-
ment should have been rendered for the plaintiff. 18
The Oklahoma Supreme Court again confronted a case involving a top
lease inJennings v. Ellott,19 and upheld the right of a landowner to execute
an oil and gas lease covering land subject to an unexpired prior lease. The
plaintiff landowners inJennings sought to cancel defendants' prior lease and
to enjoin defendants from entering and trespassing on the leasehold prem-
ises. As defendants, the bottom lessees sought to restrain or enjoin plaintiffs
from alienating or disposing of the oil and gas rights conveyed under their
prior lease (that is, from executing a top lease), while their prior lease was
still in force.2 0 Concerning the top lease, the court stated:
In Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh,2 the right of a land owner to execute an
oil and gas lease covering land that is already subject to an
unexpired prior lease was before the court and upheld. However,
the second lessee does not acquire the right to explore, develop for,
and produce oil from the premises as against the prior lessee until
the prior lease had terminated. If plaintiffs should execute such a
18. Id. at 196, 224 P.2d at 697-98.
19. 186 Okla. 285, 97 P.2d 67 (1939).
20. Id. at 287, 97 P.2d at 70.
21. 121 Okla. 135, 248 P. 329 (1926). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma considered a top
lease in the context of a lawsuit on the question of whether the bottom lease had expired at the
end of its primary term. The plaintiff in Gypsy Oil, the top lessee, brought an action to cancel
the prior lease, for possession of the leased premises and to enjoin the defendant, the prior lessee,
from asserting any right, title, or interest in the premises. Despite the above-cited statement in
the later decision inJmngs about the holding of the Gypsy Oil court, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in that latter case did not specifically discuss the issue of the legality of the top lease or its
existence as a defense, and affirmed the trial court's decision to cancel the bottom lease because
the prior lessee had failed to discover oil or gas in paying quantities before the primary term of
the bottom lease had expired. The legality of the top lease seems to be presumed.
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lease it would in no way interfere with defendants in whatever
rights they may eventually be adjudged to have under the lease
they claim to be still in force.
22
Other jurisdictions have similarly upheld the practice of top leasing for
oil and gas. For example, in the case of Bamelt v. Geto Oil Co., 2 3 the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court considered a bottom lessee's contention that the partic-
ular top lease involved was not a valid and subsisting oil, gas and mineral
lease. The court rejected that contention as follows:
Whether you consider the lease a present grant of a future interest
or otherwise, the fact that the primary term was not to commence
until a date in the future does not alter the fact that the said lease
was valid, subsisting and in effect according to its terms from the
moment of its execution .... 24
B. Reject'on of the Top Lease
The Oklahoma case of Simons v. McDan'el2 5 has been noted as one of the
few cases in which the bare existence of a top lease was held to constitute an
obstruction of the bottom lessee's title.26 However, the decision can be dis-
tinguished on its facts and has been correctly classified as an "anomaly" in
this area.
27
In Sinons, the lessor granted plaintiffs, the bottom lessees, a lease with a
term of five years; the lease provided that "if no well be commenced" on or
before the end of the primary term, the lease was to terminate, subject to the
lessees' right to make delay rental payments. Four months before the pri-
mary term expired, the lessor's successors granted defendants top leases cov-
ering the same lands. The top leases became effective two weeks after the
prior lease's primary term expired. The bottom lessees commenced a well,
however, just before the term expired. And, prior to the expiration date, the
bottom lessees brought a quiet title action to eliminate the top leases as a
cloud on their title. They also sought a court order that would permit them
to cease drilling operations under the bottom lease pending resolution of the
dispute.
The court held that the right to commence a well within the primary
term carried with it the right, after the term expired, to complete the well
begun within the term when the lessee acted in good faith. 28 Regarding the
top leases, the court stated:
The acts of the [lessors], in executing and delivering 'top leases,'
was an election to declare the first lease at an end [citations omit-
ted] ....
22. 186 Okla. at 288, 97 P.2d at 70-71. The court went on to state: "Particularly is this
true in the instant case for any person who might purchase a second lease after this action had
been commenced, would be a purchaser pendente lite, and would of necessity take subject to
any judgment or decree that might thereafter be rendered or entered in defendants' favor." Id.
23. 266 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1972).
24. Id. at 585.
25. 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932).
26. See Brown, supra note 1, at 218; Ernest, supra note 1, at 958-59.
27. Brown, supra note 1, at 220.
28. 154 Okla. at 170, 7 P.2d at 420-21.
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These acts obstructed the exercise of the rights of the original
lessees under the terms of their lease. Their title was clouded. Had
they produced oil or gas as a result of commenced development,
ownership thereof would have been in litigation and the value of
production impounded, so that a real obstacle was imposed by les-
sors upon the right of lessee plaintiffs.
29
The court in Simons found that the bottom lessees were acting in good faith
and permitted them to suspend operations pending resolution of the pro-
ceedings to remove obstructions imposed by the lessors.
30
The court's decision in Si'mons that the top leases constituted "clouds on
title" is difficult to understand in the context of other decisions in this area,
including prior Oklahoma cases.3 1 The fact that the practice of top leasing
has been condoned by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in decisions before and
after Simons makes the latter decision puzzling in light of the fact that the
top leases involved in S&nons were prospective (that is, they were to take
effect two weeks after the end of the bottom lease's primary term).
A 1966 case, Robinson v. Conti'nental Oil Co. ,32 is consistent with Simons in
holding that a top lease not "subject to" a bottom lease is a cloud on the
bottom lessee's title.3 3 The Robinson case involved a suit by a lessor to cancel
an oil and gas lease on the ground that it expired by its own terms or by the
lessee's breach of the implied covenant to develop. In holding for the oil and
gas lessee, the court found that the lessee had established a commercial gas
well within the primary term, that the lessee was entitled to reasonable time
in which to locate a market for the well, and that the lessee had not obli-
gated to tender shut-in payments while lessee's title was under attack by
lessor.
34
While considering the lessee's obligation to tender shut-in payments, the
court in Robinson discussed the fact that the lessor had executed top leases
covering the same lands as the lease in question. The court stated:
Further, we conclude that while Continental made a timely
tender of shut-in payments, it was under no obligation to make
such tender because defendant's title was at the time under attack
by plaintiff as lessor. The execution of top leases by plaintiff...
was in our opinion a challenge of Continental's title (citations
omitted).
3 5
29. Id., 7 P.2d at 420.
30. Id. at 170-71, 7 P.2d at 421.
31. For an articulate discussion as to the rather puzzling holding of Si)nons, see Brown,
supra note 1, at 218-19.
32. 255 F. Supp. 61 (D. Kan. 1966).
33. See also Berry v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 188 F.2d 820, 822 n.4 (5th Cir. 1951).
This latter decision cites the Texas case of Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946), for the proposition that a lessor's execution of a top lease constitutes a declaration of
forfeiture, thus forbidding drilling operations by the bottom lessee. A close reading of the Shell
Oil decision reveals that it is weak authority for the proposition cited by the Fifth Circuit. In
SAll Oil, the lessor not only executed top leases, but repudiated the bottom leases and de-
manded their release by the bottom lessee prior to expiration of their primary term. See Brown,
supra note 1, at 229-30.
34. 255 F. Supp. at 63-64.
35. Id. at 63.
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As judicial precedent, the quoted statement of the court in Robinson is ques-
tionable. As pointed out by one commentator, the court's reliance on cited
authority appears to be misplaced. 36 Furthermore, the holding of the Robin-
son court was based on alternative grounds, namely that the lessor "at-
tacked" the bottom lessee's title through litigation to cancel the bottom lease
before the first shut-in royalty was due.
37
The decisions, even though they seem to be against the weight of au-
thority in this area, should not be taken lightly. To be safe, a top lease
should state expressly that it is taken subject to the rights of prior lessees
under the terms of any valid and subsisting bottom lease in existence at the
time the top lease is executed.
III. PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF Top LEASING
A. The Two-Party Top Lease
As stated above, a two-party top lease situation is one in which, for one
reason or another, the bottom lessee secures another lease from the lessor
before the primary term of his prior lease expires, with the top lease to take
effect at the expiration of the earlier lease. In many instances, such a situa-
tion would not cause great concern to an oil and gas lawyer or landman.
However, there are certain circumstances in which the bottom lessee's ac-
tions may result in litigation. Two such circumstances involve the issues of
whether the top lessee may avoid overriding royalty and gas purchase con-
tract obligations created under or burdening his bottom lease.
1. Extinguishing Overriding Royalty Obligations
One of the questions that may arise in the two-party top lease situation
is whether overriding royalty obligations, created during the term of the bot-
tom lease, survive the execution of a top lease. Cases indicate that the an-
swer depends on the facts surrounding the creation of the overriding royalty.
Where the lessee obtains his bottom lease by assignment, and the assignor's
sole consideration for making the assignment is the reservation of the over-
ride, the overriding royalty will likely burden the lessee's top lease. Con-
versely, where other additional consideration is involved in the assignment of
the bottom lease, the lessee may be found to take his top lease free from the
previously created overriding royalty burden.
Brannan v. Sohio Petroleum Co. 38 involved a suit to establish and enforce
an assignor's right to an overriding royalty interest in an oil and gas lease-
hold. Plaintiffs had assigned to defendant two oil and gas leases covering
lands in Oklahoma. The leases were for a primary term of five years, termi-
nating October 25, 1954. Each assignment reserved to the assignors an over-
riding royalty of one-sixteenth of seven-eighths of all oil and gas produced on
the premises. Shortly before the primary lease terms expired, defendant ob-
tained a top lease covering both tracts from the mineral owners. The top
36. Brown, supra note 1, at 220 n.56.
37. 255 F. Supp. at 63. See Brown, supra note 1, at 220.
38. 260 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1958).
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lease provided that it was subject to existing leases and should not go into
effect until the existing leases terminated. Defendant did nothing to develop
the premises during the life of the original leases. Then, after the original
leases expired and the top lease became effective, defendant developed the
premises and obtained production. Plaintiffs claimed an overriding royalty
interest in the oil and gas produced, but defendant successfully resisted the
claim.
3 9
The plaintiffs in Brannan contended that a fiduciary relationship existed
between them and defendant, and that after defendant's top lease became
effective, they were entitled to a constructive trust upon the leasehold estate
for the undivided portion of production reserved in the earlier lease assign-
ments. The court stated:
In ordinary circumstances, the mere reserving of an overriding roy-
alty interest in the assignment of an oil and gas lease-alone and
without more--does not create a confidential or fiduciary relation-
ship between the assignor and the assignee which denies to the as-
signee the right to obtain from the owner of the land a top lease to
take effect after the expiration of the assigned lease free of the bur-
den of the overriding royalty, either in the form of a constructive
trust or otherwise.
4 °
The court distinguished the Brannan decision from that in Rees v. Bn's-
coe,41 where the Oklahoma Supreme Court had held that a fiduciary rela-
tionship existed between an assignee and an assignor. The Rees court had
determined that where the assignor had received no consideration for the
leases except the overriding royalty interest and the assignee's express agree-
ment that a well would be drilled, the assignee took renewal leases impressed
with a trust in favor of the assignors and respecting their overriding royalty
interest reserved in the original lease assignments. The court in Rees had
said it was unreasonable to assume that the assignor would assign the leases
for no present consideration unless he felt he could depend upon the assignee
to undertake development of the leases.
In contrast, the assignors in Brannan not only reserved the overriding
royalty, but also were paid a cash bonus of fifty dollars per acre for the land
covered by the assigned leases, and nothing was said about drilling a well on
that land. The Brannan court held that the assignment created no fiduciary
relationship impinging upon the assignee's right to obtain a top lease that
would become effective on termination of the assigned leases, "free of any
burden either in the form of a constructive trust or otherwise concerning the
share in the production reserved in the assignment."1
42
A recent decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, St. Clair v.
Exeter Exploration Co., 4 3 involved the question of whether plaintiff, pursuant
to a turnkey agreement by which plaintiff had sold a number of properties
(including a farmout of the bottom lease) to defendant, was entitled to re-
39. Id. at 621-23.
40. Id. at 622.
41. 315 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1957).
42. 260 F.2d at 623.
43. 671 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1982).
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ceive an assignment of an overriding royalty under a top lease acquired by
defendant. In brief, the primary term of one of the leases subject to the
turnkey agreement expired; the defendant, however, secured a top lease on
those lands prior to the expiration date. Defendant refused plaintiff's re-
quest that defendant assign plaintiff an override under the top lease pursu-
ant to the turnkey agreement. In a decision that turns largely on the
language of the particular contracts involved, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the lower court decision which required the defendant to assign the
override.
44
2. Extinguishing Gas Purchase Contract Obligations
A recent federal decision, Amarex, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatoy Commis-
si'n,45 concerned a two-party top lease situation involving a gas purchase
contract. Amarex had acquired by assignment the bottom lease, which com-
menced in 1967, with a primary term ending in 1972, covering a quarter-
section of land. That lease was included in a 1970 contract for the sale of
natural gas to the Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company (Arkla) for a primary
period of twenty years. By virtue of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) order regarding small producers, Amarex was granted a certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity of unlimited duration covering all Amarex
sales and services in interstate commerce.
Amarex's service under the 1970 gas purchase contract began with ini-
tial deliveries to Arkla in 1971 of gas from acreage included in the contract,
but not from the quarter-section covered by the 1967 bottom lease.
Amarex's leasehold interest in the lands covered by the 1967 lease expired in
September, 1976. Some five months earlier, however, the lessors executed a
top lease with Amarex covering the same quarter-section of land, with a
primary term of five years beginning on the date the 1967 lease expired.
Before executing the 1972 top lease, Amarex requested a title opinion,
which advised that any gas produced from the premises would be subject to
the 1970 gas purchase contract. Despite that advice, Amarex refused to
comply with Arkla's request that gas attributable to Amarex's interest in the
subject quarter-section be delivered to Arkla when production began under
the 1972 top lease.
Both parties commenced proceedings before FERC. Arkla first filed a
complaint asking FERC to direct Amarex to deliver the natural gas attribu-
table to Amarex's oil and gas leasehold in the lands covered by the 1972 top
lease. Amarex, in turn, filed a petition for a declaratory order that Arkla
was not entitled to the gas from Amarex's 1972 leasehold.
46
FERC held that the public service obligation, imposed by Amarex's
small producer certificate of public convenience and necessity and the terms
of the 1970 gas purchase contract between Amarex and Arkla, applied to
Amarex's leasehold interest under the 1972 top lease, and directed Amarex
44. Id. at 1097.
45. 603 F.2d 127 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 444 U.S. 1102 (1979).
46. Id. at 128-29.
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to deliver to Arkla any gas produced from or attributable to Amarex's inter-
est in the subject quarter-section for interstate transportation and sale.4 7
Amarex appealed FERC's order.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order, following the
Supreme Court's holding in California v. Southland Royaly Co.48 In Southland,
the Supreme Court examined FERC's interpretation of the relevant portion
of the Natural Gas Act,49 which provides that, once gas has begun to flow in
interstate commerce from a field subject to a certificate of unlimited dura-
tion, a service obligation is imposed, and the expiration of a lease on the field
does not affect the obligation to continue the flow of gas; the service obliga-
tion cannot be terminated unless FERC authorizes abandonment of
service. 50
Relying on Southland, the Tenth Circuit found that Amarex was in an
even less favorable position than was Southland Royalty Company. South-
land Royalty Company was a stranger to the gas purchase contract and the
certificate involved in the Southland case. 5 1 Such was not the case in Amarex,
where the top lessee was a party to the contract and had been delivering gas
pursuant to its certificate of unlimited duration.
The teaching of the Amarex decision, when read in light of Southland, is
that a top lessee will not be able to "top" his own bottom lease to avoid the
obligations of a gas purchase contract burdening the bottom lease where
interstate deliveries have been made pursuant to a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity of unlimited duration.
It is crucial that the Amarex and South/and decisions, read jointly, not
only control in a two-party top lease situation, but also in a three-party top
lease situation. Therefore, where a third party top leases an existing lease
that is subject to a gas purchase contract, and the bottom lease is included in
a field from which gas is being delivered in interstate commerce pursuant to
the contract and to a certificate of public convenience and necessity of un-
limited duration, the top lessee may not avoid the obligations of the gas
purchase contract.
B. The Three-Party Top Lease
In a three-party top lease situation, most disputes arise between the top
lessee and the bottom lessee over whose lease is valid. Therefore, questions of
whether the bottom lessee has extended his lease into its secondary term by
47. Id. at 129 (citing Commission Opinion No. 798). FERC denied Amarex's application
for rehearing in Opinion 798-A, but permitted Amarex to deliver gas to Arkla under a protec-
tive order, pending the outcome of judicial review.
48. 436 U.S. 519 (1978). Judge McWilliams' Tenth Circuit opinion was written after the
opinion of the Supreme Court in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529 (1978).
Although Judge McWilliams stated in his opinion that the court believed the McCombs decision
fully supported the result reached in the Amarex case, Judge Barrett's concurring opinion raises
some doubt. Judge Barrett's concern is not relevant here, however, as it deals with whether
Southland should be broadened beyond McCombs to include dedications of all "fields" subject to
the certificate.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
50. 436 U.S. at 525.
51. 603 F.2d at 131.
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production, pooling, payment of shut-in royalties or otherwise, dominate.
Central to three-party top lease situations is the risk involved in top leasing
should the bottom lease be extended. By entering into a top lease, a lessee
gambles that he may lose the portion of the bonus he pays the mineral owner
upon execution of the top lease if the bottom lease does not expire at the end
of its primary term.
In most cases, the top lessee should be able to avoid litigation by verify-
ing conclusively, prior to taking possession of the leased premises, that the
bottom lease has in fact expired by its terms. Such a factual determination is
not always easy, however, and disputes may ensue even though the top lessee
has satisfied himself that the bottom lease expired prior to his entry. The
result is often an action in trespass.
1. Trespass
Several courts have found a top lessee in trespass where the top lessee
has entered onto the leased premises and started drilling operations after the
end of the bottom lease's primary term. 52 In general, these cases involve
situations where, for one reason or another, the top lessee believes that the
prior lease has expired but in fact the bottom lease has been extended into its
secondary term, either by pooling, by commencement of drilling operations,
by production prior to expiration, or otherwise. However, where the bottom
lessee does not relinquish his leasehold when his lease has expired, the top
lessee might recover damages for the bottom lessee's trespass as well.
53
The first case to consider trespass by a top lessee, Swiss Oil Corp. v.
Hupp,54 involved an action for damages by a bottom lessee against a top
lessee whose lease had been adjudicated invalid and who had been found in
trespass in an earlier decision.
The issue in Swiss Oil-and central to any case concerned with assessing
damages where a top lessee has trespassed-was whether the top lessee was a
"willful" or "innocent" trespasser. As stated by the court in Swiss Oil, that
distinction generally is made using the following test:
The conditions and behavior are usually such that the court can
determine whether the trespass was perpetrated in a spirit of
wrongdoing, with a knowledge that it was wrong, or whether it was
done under a bona fide mistake, as where the circumstances were
calculated to induce or justify the reasonably prudent man, acting
with a proper sense of the rights of others, to go in and to continue
along the way.55
Included among the factors the Swiss Oil court considered as evidencing the
good faith of the top lessee were: 1) at least reasonable doubt existed as to
the bottom lessee's exclusive or dominant right; and 2) the top lessee acted
52. See, e.g., Joyce v. Zachary, 434 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1968); Lebow v. Cameron, 394 S.W.2d
773 (Ky. 1965); Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (1934); Lone Star
Producing Co. v. Walker, 257 So. 2d 496 (Miss. 1971). See also Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp.,
604 F.2d 1063, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1979).
53. See, e.g., Lone Star Producing Co. v. Walker, 257 So. 2d 496 (Miss. 1971).
54. 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (1934).
55. Id. at 560, 69 S.W.2d at 1041.
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upon the advice of counsel, to whom all the facts had been fairly submitted.
Using these factors and considering the specific facts presented, the court
affirmed the trial court's finding that the top lessee was an innocent
trespasser.
The court then turned to the question of damages. The bottom lessee
sought to recover the "gross" receipts of the oil produced by the top lessee,
based on the contention that the top lessee was a willful trespasser. As
stated, however, the court found that the top lessee was an innocent tres-
passer. The court considered the weight of authority regarding the measure
of damages for a good faith trespass or appropriation, and found it to be the
value of the oil at the mouth of the well, less the amount reasonably ex-
pended in producing it.
56
The top lessee urged the court to employ the exception to the general
rule, recognized in Kentucky, that establishes the damage or compensation
as the customary royalty paid in the community. 57 The court distinguished
that rule, stating that it was only a fair measure of damages as between a
mineral owner and a trespasser who has removed the mineral. As between
two oil and gas lessees, the court noted that in the usual contractual relation
a lessee is entitled to seven-eighths of the oil produced and not, as in the case
of the landowner, one-eighth of the oil produced.58 The top lessee also urged
the court to allow it to return the same quantity of oil it took from the lease.
The court termed this a "novel proposition" and rejected it, noting that the
decrease in the value of oil since the top lessee had removed it from the
premises was a matter of common knowledge.
59
The court in Swiss Oil followed the weight of authority and concluded
that the bottom lessee was entitled to the top lessee's net profits, that is, to
the value of the oil at the mouth of the well as established by the sale price,
less reasonable costs and expenses of production.60 The court considered
several contested deductions by the top lessee. It rejected the top lessee's
attempt to deduct the value of improvements, income taxes and legal fees.
6 1
The court also refused to disturb the trial court's discretionary ruling that
the bottom lessee was not entitled to recover interest.
62
Subsequent cases in Kentucky further illuminate the question of mea-
suring damages owed by the top lessee who is an innocent trespasser. For
example, in the case ofJoyce v. Zachary,63 Kentucky's highest court again held
that the top lessee was liable to the bottom lessee for his net profits. InJoyce,
the top lessee was entitled to take the following deductions: 1) waterflooding
56. Id. at 564, 69 S.W.2d at 1043 (citing Barnes v. Winona Oil Co., 83 Okla. 253, 200 P.
985 (1921); L. MILLS & J. WILLINGHAM, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 22 (1926); 1 S. WILLIS,
THORNTON ON OIL AND GAS § 59 (5th ed. 1932)).
57. The court seemed to indicate that the Kentucky law in this regard stemmed from coal
cases. See, .g., Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Harlan Gas Coal Co., 245 Ky. 234, 53 S.W.2d 538
(1932); New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. 183, 221 S.W. 245 (1920).
58. Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 565, 69 S.W.2d 1037, 1044 (1934).
59. Id. at 567, 69 S.W.2d at 1044-45.
60. Id. at 567, 69 S.W.2d at 1044.
61. Id. at 567-69, 69 S.W.2d at 1045.
62. Id. at 569, 69 S.W.2d at 1046.
63. 434 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1968).
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expenses; 2) ad valorem taxes; 3) overpayment of landowner's royalties;
4) operating expenses after suit was filed; and 5) expenses for drilling a dry
hole.64 The court rejected the top lessee's attempt to deduct "supervisory'!
expenses of one of its non-participating partners.
65
Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp. 66 is a recent federal decision consistent
with the Kentucky cases discussed above. The Superior Oil facts were as fol-
lows: in 1949, the mineral owners executed an oil and gas lease to Superior
Oil Company covering 3,440 acres of land in Banner County, Nebraska.
The lease had a primary term of ten years and "as long thereafter as oil, gas,
* ..or any of the products covered by this lease is or can be produced." Oil
was discovered and produced within the primary term, and in 1961, that
part of the Superior leasehold on which oil was being produced was unitized
into the Willson Ranch Field "J" Sand Unit.
6 7
After 1961, neither Superior nor its subsequent assignees conducted fur-
ther drilling on the tracts covered by the Superior lease. In February 1976,
the successors in interest to the original lessors executed oil and gas top leases
to Chris L. Christensen, Jr., on certain tracts that were subject to the prior
Superior lease, and an oil well was successfully completed in February
1977. 68
In June 1977, Superior and its assignees filed an action naming as de-
fendants the lessors, and the lessee and assignees under the 1976 top leases.
Plaintiffs alleged in part that the lessors breached their contract with plain-
tiffs by executing the top leases, thereby creating a cloud on title, and that
the top lessee and his assignees were guilty of trespass and conversion. Plain-
tiffs sought injunctive relief, an accounting, and a decree quieting title to the
leasehold. In turn, the lessors sought cancellation of the Superior lease for
plaintiffs' breach of the implied covenant of further development, which cov-
enant, apparently, had not previously been recognized under Nebraska
law.
69
The district court concluded that it had to find the lessors liable for the
execution of the top leases unless the bottom lessee, Superior, and its assign-
ees had violated the implied covenant to further develop prior to February
of 1976.70 The court then found that Superior had failed to meet the stan-
dards required of a prudent operator and that prior to February 1976 it had
breached the implied covenant to further develop. 7 1 The court dismissed
64. Id. at 661-63.
65. Id. at 662.
66. 604 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1979).
67. Id. at 1066.
68. Id.
69. Id. See Note, Oiland G as, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1429-35 (1980).
70. Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp., 458 F. Supp. 1063, 1071 (D. Neb. 1978), revld, 604
F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1979). The decision of the lower court held that, as between Superior and
the lessors, the express terms of the 1949 lease had not been breached and that neither the
failure to file an affidavit of production (required by Nebraska law) nor the subsequent unitiza-
tion agreement altered the lessor-lessee contractual relationship between those parties.
71. 458 F. Supp. at 1075. The court held that an adjudication of breach of the implied
covenant to further develop was not barred by the failure of the lessors to demand further
drilling, and ordered that portion of the Superior lease outside the Willson Ranch Field "J"
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plaintiffs' claim against the top lessee and his assignees. 72
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the Superior
lease should not have been cancelled because the lessee had not been served
with notice or demand before the lessor executed the top leases. 73 The court
held that the lack of notice and an opportunity for redemption protected the
lease against allegations of a breach of implied covenant to further develop;
consequently, the district court erred in dismissing the action. However, the
court of appeals' decision did not rest upon a finding of insufficient notice to
the plaintiffs; the court also considered the question of notice to the
defendants:
The fact that the Superior lease was valid and prior to the [top]
lease does not ipsofacto make the [top lessee and his assignees] tres-
passers and converters . . . Although the Superior lease, as be-
tween Superior and its lessors, was held by production after
expiration of the primary term in 1959, no affidavit of production
was filed under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 57-208. . . .Section 57-208 is a
notice statute to the public. . . . The 1949 lease did not provide
notice to subsequent purchasers of its existence after the expiration
of the primary term. A purchaser after August 1, 1959, who relied
upon the public records and who did not otherwise have actual or
constructive notice of the Superior lease would therefore be a sub-
sequent good faith purchaser for value, and his leasehold interest
would be prior to that of the lessees under the Superior lease.
74
The Eighth Circuit concluded that if the top lessee and his assignees did
not have actual or constructive notice of oil production under the Superior
lease, they would be bona fide purchasers for value and the bottom lessee's
only recourse would be against the lessors. 75 The court continued, "[i]f,
however, the [top lessee or his assignees] had actual or constructive notice of
plaintiffs' interests, they would be trespassers and converters and would be i'able to
plaint# for damages and such other relief as may be appropriate."76
In a significant footnote, 77 the court stated that the top lessee may have
made a good faith but mistaken determination that the Superior lease was
not held by production. The appellate court pointed to the lower court's
finding that the top lessee had conducted a title search, obtained an attor-
ney's title opinion and concluded that Superior's lease was not held by pro-
duction. The court noted that if the lower court upon reconsideration found
the top lessee had actual or constructive notice of production from the Supe-
Sand Unit cancelled unconditionally as of a time preceding the execution of the top leases. Id.
at 1078-80.
72. Id. at 1080.
73. The Eighth Circuit grounded its reversal on the principle that an oil and gas lease is a
recognized and protected property interest, that a cancellation of an oil and gas lease effects a
forfeiture of that interest and that the law abhors a forfeiture. Accordingly, the court concluded
that an oil and gas lease will not be cancelled for breach of an implied covenant without the
lessor having first given the lessee notice of the breach and demanding that the terms of the
implied covenant be complied with within a reasonable time. 604 F.2d at 1069.
74. Id. at 1072 (citing Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Adair, 273 F.2d 673, 677 (10th Cir. 1959);
Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Dev. Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974)).
75. 604 F.2d at 1072.
76. Id. at 1072-73 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 1073 n.13.
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rior leasehold, "under the circumstances of the case equity may require that
they recover their drilling and production CoStS." 78 The court, therefore, im-
plicitly recognized the willful-innocent distinction in damages for trespass in
a case where the top lessee was found liable for irespass against the bottom
lessee's leasehold.
In sum, the Superior Oil decision is instructive for top lessees who execute
a top lease on a bottom lease that is within its secondary term. If the lands
are within a jurisdiction, such as Colorado 79 or Nebraska,80 that requires an
affidavit of production to be placed of record as constructive notice that a
lease has been extended by production into its secondary term, and no such
affidavit is of record under the bottom lease, the top lessee who does not
otherwise have actual or constructive notice of the continued effectiveness of
the bottom lease may be elevated to the status of a bona fide purchaser. As
such, his lease may be insulated from liability. The bottom lessee's only legal
recourse in such an event would lie against the lessor.
A decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Lone Star Producing Co. v.
Walker,81 presents the reverse side of the top lessee-as-trespasser case. In Lone
Star, the top lessee recovered damages from a bottom lessee who was adjudg-
ed to have an invalid lease after production ceased for an unreasonable time
during the bottom lease's secondary term. The bottom lessee in Lone Star
had extended his lease past its primary term by production. The top lease
was entered into during the sixty-day window period allowed for beginning
drilling or reworking operations after production ceased. In fact, production
under the bottom lease ceased for more than sixty days before reworking
operations began.
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding that
the delay invalidated the bottom lease and that the top lessee's lease was
therefore valid.82 The top lessee was able to clear the cloud on his title cre-
ated by the bottom lessee's continued possession under the terminated prior
lease. Further, the court held that the top lessee was entitled to damages in
the amount of the value of production from the date of the bottom lessee's
completion of reworking operations, less the bottom lessee's reasonable costs
of production.
8 3
2. Protecting Against Last-Minute Bottom Lease Extensions
One of the most difficult issues in the three-party top lease situation
arises in the following factual situation: A, the mineral owner, leases the oil
and gas leasehold estate to B, the bottom lessee. Before the primary term of
78. Id.
79. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-42-106 (1973).
80. NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-208 (1978).
81. 257 So. 2d 496 (Miss. 1971). It might be noted that the top leases involved in Lone Star
were executed two years after the expiration of the primary term of the bottom lease; however,
the "top lease" classification was correct because at the time of their execution the bottom lease
was still alive by virtue of the clause in the bottom lease granting the lessee 60 days to engage in
drilling or reworking operations after cessation of production.
82. Id. at 500-01.
83. Id. at 501.
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that lease expires, A enters into a top lease with C, and then executes an
extension agreement with B, extending the bottom lease. Do A's actions in
extending the bottom lease render C's top lease ineffective?
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Rorex v. Karcher,84 discussed
above, is authority for the proposition that the bottom lessee's rights under
such an extension agreement would be subject to the superior rights of the
top lessee. For this to be the case, however, the court in Rorex made the
following point:
It is insisted by the defendants, that one of the rights of the lessees
under the first lease was to procure an extension of time during the
lifetime of the first lease. There was no provision in the lease con-
tract granting an extension or right of extension to the lessees, and
any extension procured by the lessees was subject to the rights of
intervening third persons. Prior to the time the extension was pro-
cured, the rights of the plaintiff intervened by reason of his lease,
and any extension granted after the execution of the lease to the
plaintiff was taken subject to the rights of the plaintiff under his
lease.
8 5
At least in Oklahoma, therefore, it appears that so long as the bottom lease
does not expressly grant an extension or create a right of extension in the
lessee, any extension procurred by the bottom lessee would be subject to the
rights of an intervening third-party top lessee.
The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed a related situation in Wllan v.
Farrar8 6 and found that, having entered into a top lease, the lessor owes a
duty to the top lessee not to render the provisions of the top lease ineffective.
In Willan, Willan's oil and gas leases, which provided for termination unless
delay rentals were paid by a specified date, burdened the lessor's mineral
estate. Before delay rentals became due under Willan's bottom leases, the
lessor executed top leases that apparently were to be effective only if the
bottom leases terminated for failure to pay the rentals. Although there was
some dispute as to whether the lessor extended the time for rental payment
and whether he actually accepted the payment, the bottom lessee tendered
delay rental payment after the due date. The bottom lessee then brought an
action to quiet its title in the leasehold.
The question before the court was whether the bottom lessee paid his
delay rentals before the due date. The court concluded, "[tihe evidence is
plain he did not and the top leases thereupon fell into place according to
their terms."
'8 7
In a well-reasoned opinion, the Willan court cited favorably to Rorex v.
Karcher, discussed above, and held:
The top leases were expressly given to be in force on the termina-
tion of the prior ones because of nonpayment of the rentals. The
[lessors] evidently desired that their premises remain under lease if
Willan's delay rentals were not paid. Though [the bottom lessee]
84. 101 Okla. 195, 224 P. 696 (1924). See supra text accompanying note 17.
85. Id. at 196, 224 P.2d at 697-98.
86. 176 Neb. I, 124 N.W.2d 699 (1963).
87. Id. at 7, 124 N.W.2d at 704.
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had an option by which he could continue the leases by paying the
rentals when they became due, he was under no obligation to do so.
[The lessorsj having given the top leases to [the top lessee] owed a duty not
to render their provisions inective. The purpose of[the top] leases should
not be permitted to be defeated by the actions of the lessors at will.88
The Rorex and the Willan cases indicate that the top lessee may be able
to prevent the lessor or bottom lessee from defeating the top lessee's rights as
an intervening purchaser. One important caveat should be remembered,
however: the top lessee's rights are always subject to the bottom lessee's
rights under the terms of the latter's lease. Therefore, if the bottom lease
expressly grants the right to an extension or the right to pool, and the lands
are pooled or an extension agreement is entered into after the top lease is
executed but before the bottom lease expires, the top lease would not take
effect.
Riders might be employed by a top lessee who wants to avoid the situa-
tion litigated in Rorex.89
IV. SUMMARY OF LEGAL THEORIES THAT MAY
INVALIDATE A Top LEASE
A bottom lessee who has been "topped" may assert a number of differ-
ent theories of liability against the lessor and/or the top lessee. Although
many but not all of these theories have been touched upon, several deserve
special summary treatment. The theories that might invalidate a top lease
include: 1) violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities; 2) cloud on title;
3) obstruction of the prior lessee's interest; 4) tortious interference with the
prior lessee's contractual rights; and 5) trespass by the top lessee.
A. Violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities
Although this theory of liability will arise only in the rarest of circum-
stances, an improperly drafted top lease may be invalid if it does not meet
the test imposed by the Rule Against Perpetuities. The Rule Against Perpe-
tuities stems from the common law of England, and was developed as a legal
mechanism to prevent the creation of remote future interests in real property
that might never vest. Despite its archaic roots, the Rule is still recognized
in many jurisdictions. The Rule, as commonly phrased, states that "no in-
terest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some
88. Id. at 6, 124 N.W.2d at 704 (emphasis added).
89. The following are examples of riders that might be used to protect the top lessee from
prior lease extensions:
Example /: Lessor agrees to execute no agreements, the effect of which would be
to extend the primary term of the said prior lease.
Example 2: Lessor represents and warrants that lessor has not entered into any
renewal or agreement to renew said prior lease or amended said prior lease so as to
extend the primary term as set forth or recorded therein. Further, lessor covenants
and agrees not to extend, amend or modify said existing lease.
The riders probably would be effective only where the bottom lease is silent on the right to
extension, however, because the top lessee's rights should always be subject to the rights of the




life in being at the time of creation of the interest."9 0
Simply stated, if a lessor purports to grant a top lease that is to vest at
the time the existing lease terminates, the top lease might be held to be void
under the Rule because there is no assurance that the bottom lease will ter-
minate or that the top lessee's leasehold interest will vest within the
perpetuity period.9 1
The likelihood of such an improperly drafted top lease running afoul of
the Rule Against Perpetuities is confirmed by case law.9 2 In a recent case,
Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan,93 the top lessees sought to quiet title in
their leasehold estates. Defendants were the assignees under the prior leases.
Plaintiffs contended that defendants' leases had expired at the end of their
primary term. The defendants in their counterclaim asserted that plaintiffs'
top leases violated the Rule Against Perpetuities and were void.
The top leases in issue in Stoltz provided:
[Flor a term of one (1) year from and after the 8th day of August,
1975, or from and after the expiration of the existing . . . lease,
whichever is the later, hereafter called 'primary term' and as long
thereafter as oil, gas . . . may be produced.9 4
The court held that under Oklahoma law, a party cannot maintain an ac-
tion to quiet title unless he has a title or an interest in the land. As stated,
the top leases provided that their effective date was August 8, 1975, or "at
the expiration of the existing oil and gas lease, whichever is the later." The
court found that the top leases appeared to violate the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities.9 5 However, the court maintained that the plaintiffs' top leases could
be reformed under the "cy pres" provision of the Oklahoma statutes,
9 6
which would act to delete the provision for bringing the top lease into effect
at the expiration of the existing lease. The court held that, once reformed, it
would be possible for the plaintiffs' top leases to vest on August 8, 1975, or
within the one-year primary term provided for in the top leases, if the owner
of the existing leases failed to extend the primary term of his leases.
The court held that the plaintiffs had valid top leases as reformed and
could maintain an action to quiet title. However, the court held for the
defendants. It found that they had commenced drilling work on August 6,
1975, which was within the primary term of their leases, and that they had
continued in good faith and with due diligence so as to comply with the
extension terms of their leases. Therefore, the bottom lessees continued their
leases beyond their primary terms and, as stated by the court, the top lessees
"lost their gamble and must lose their quest to quiet their title to the leases
90. J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUrrIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
9 1. 1 E. KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 17.2 (13th ed. 1962 & Supp. 198 1); see alro Ernest,
spra note 1, at 961-62.
92. See, e.g., Greenshields v. Superior Oil Co., 204 Okla. 681, 233 P.2d 959 (1961).
93. 417 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
94. Id. at 556.
95. Id.
96. OKLA. STAT. 60, §§ 75-77 (1971). The cy pres doctrine acts as a liberal rule of con-
struction to allow the fulfillment of an underlying intent to be carried out where the instrument
would not permit the intended grant. Thus, the Oklahoma statutes allow an instrument to be
reformed to meet the intent of the parties where the Rule is violated.
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they topped."9'
B. Cloud on Title
If there is a valid non-producing oil and gas lease outstanding, and the
primary term is about to expire, the lessor cannot grant a "naked" top lease
(one which does not recognize the existence and priority of any outstanding
lease and appears to be effective as of the date of execution). Such a grant
arguably would cloud the title of the lessee's outstanding lease. Simons and
Robinson illustrate this point.9 8
C. Obstruction
Under the equitable doctrine of obstruction, the lessor of an oil and gas
lease is not permitted to assert that the lease has terminated or otherwise
come to an end for the lessee's failure to produce oil or gas or otherwise to
comply with the terms of the lease if the lessor has obstructed the operations
of the lessee, and such obstruction accounts for the failure of the lessee to
comply with the terms of the lease.99
Again, absent language subordinating the top lease to an existing lease,
the lessor cannot grant a presently effective "naked" top lease while the prior
lease remains in effect; such a grant may serve to obstruct operations under
the existing lease and thereby to perpetuate the bottom lease during the pe-
riod of obstruction.l°° The granting of a top lease, when combined with
other acts by the lessor in which he attempts to repudiate the bottom lease,
would obstruct the rights of the bottom lessee. However, so long as the top
lease recognizes the existence of the bottom lease and so long as the top lessee
and the lessor do not otherwise assert that the top lessee's rights are superior
to the bottom lessee's rights while his bottom lease is still in effect, there
should be no finding of obstruction from the mere existence of a top lease.
D. Interference with Contractual Rights
Where a top lessee has notice of an existing lease and the top lessee
begins exploration and drilling activities before it is certain that the prior
lease has terminated, the prior lessee could bring suit against the top lessee
for interference with his contractual rights. To avoid such a claim the top
lease should specifically recognize outstanding leases or option agreements
and should verify the termination of the prior lease before commencing op-
erations under the top lease.
97. 417 F. Supp. at 556.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 25-37.
99. 2 E. KuNrz, LAw OF OIL AND GAs § 26.14 (13th ed. 1964 & Supp. 1981).
100. Id; Simons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932); Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe,
197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (lessor's execution of top leases in conjunction with les-
sor's notice repudiating bottom lease and demand by lessor that bottom lessee execute a release
while bottom lease was still in effect relieved bottom lessee of operating gas well pending resolu-




Where exploration or drilling operations are conducted under a top
lease that is invalid because of the continued validity of a prior lease, a court
may find the top lessee in trespass where the top lessee had actual or con-
structive notice of the prior interest. 10 ' The cases discussed above stand for
the principle that, where the top lessee is found in trespass, he would be
liable to the prior lessee for damages and such other relief as may be appro-
priate. ' 02 The critical question for trespass damages is whether the top lessee
is a willful trespasser, or a good faith trespasser. A willful trespasser who
extracts minerals must make complete restitution without credit for expenses
incurred. When, however, the trespasser inadvertently, or under a bona fide
belief or claim of right, invades the bottom lessee's property and extracts
minerals, he is allowed credit for proper expenditures in obtaining or pro-
ducing the minerals, but is not allowed a profit.103
Where the bottom lease grants to the lessee the exclusive right to ex-
plore, the top lessee has no right to conduct geophysical exploration on the
lands covered by the bottom lease before that lease expires, absent authoriza-
tion from the bottom lessee. Any such exploration activity could subject the
top lessee to liability for seismic trespass. 104
IV. CHECKLIST FOR THE ToP LESSEE
In considering the top lessee's potential liability under various theories
that might invalidate a top lease, the following checklist is recommended for
the potential top lessee:'
0 5
A. The top lease should be dated the day it is executed.
B. The habendum clause should contain a term of years to begin
one day after the bottom lease expires. For example, if the
bottom lease expires on at midnight on March 31, 1982, insert
". .. this lease shall remain in effect for a term of X years
from April 1, 1982" (to allow for the situation where the bot-
tom lessee releases his lease prior to the expiration of the pri-
mary term, the top lessee might use a clause which states that
the primary term of the top lease is for a term of X years from
the date that the bottom lease is terminated or released, if such
termination or release occurs prior to the expiration of the pri-
mary term of the bottom lease, or April 1, 1982, whichever is
101. Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp., 604 F.2d 1063, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1979).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 52-81.
103. Swiss Oil v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (1934). The footnote in Superior Oil,
604 F.2d at 1073 n.13, is consistent with this view.
104. Although no "seismic trespass" cases could be found which involved the geophysical
trespass of a top lessee, it is extremely doubtful that the fact that the top lessee had a valid
future interest in the oil and gas leasehold would be of concern to a court where the bottom
lease provides for the exclusive right of exploration. For cases in the area of seismic trespass, see
generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957) (applying Texas law);
Franklin v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 218 La. 987, 51 So. 2d 600 (1951) (applying Louisiana law);
see also, Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943); Kennedy v. General Geophysical
Co., 213 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); (these last two decisions indicate that liability may
be imposed for deliberate and unauthorized off-site exploration, presumably for trespass).
105. See also Ernest, supra note 1, at 978-79.
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the later date). 106
C. The delay rental obligation under the top lease should com-
mence with a date one year from the day after the date upon
which the existing lease's primary term expires.
D. One or more riders should be attached to the top lease, subor-
dinating the top lease to the prior lessee's rights 10 7 and pro-
tecting the top lease from actions by the lessor that would
extend the prior lease's primary term.' 0 8
E. A portion of the bonus due for the top lease should be paid to
the mineral owner when the top lease is executed (the percent-
age of the total to be paid will vary according to the facts in-
volved, that is, depending on the area, the period remaining in
the primary term of the prior lease, etc.); the balance due
should be payable when and if the lease becomes effective. In
addition, if a rider is used to subordinate the top lease to the
prior outstanding lease, the top lessee should be in a position
to pay the remainder of the bonus for unreleased lands covered
by the top lease to the mineral owner within thirty days of
receiving notice that the bottom lease has expired. ° 9
F. A clause which allows for postponement of the second pay-
ment in case of a dispute or litigation as to whether the bottom
lease has expired should be included.
G. Record the top lease as soon as possible after execution.
H. If the bottom lease grants the lessee the exclusive right to ex-
plore, do not enter upon the leased premises to conduct geo-
physical or other exploration activities before the prior lease
106. Where, for example, the primary term of a top lease is to run three years from its
"effective date," rather than three years from the day after expiration of the bottom lease, a
court could find that the top lease expires three years from the date of its execution, rather than
three years from the date upon which the top lease received any actual rights to the mineral
leasehold. A Texas court so found in Oblegoner v. Oblegoner, 526 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975).
107. The following rider might be used to subordinate a top lease:
The lessee's rights hereunder are subordinate to that certain oil and gas lease
dated , 19 -, recorded in Book -, at - and lessee shall have no
right of entry or possession for the purpose of exercising lessee's rights hereunder to the
extent such exercise may be adverse to the right of the prior lessee, during the term of
such prior lease. After termination of such existing lease, lessor shall give lessee notice
and demand stating that said existing lease has expired. Thirty (30) days after receipt
of such demand by the lessee this lease shall become null and void, unless on or before
the end of said thirty (30) day period, lessee pays to lessor the amount equal to S -
- per net mineral acre owned by lessor in the lands described above as to which lessee
has not theretofore (or within said 30-day period) recorded a release of this lease. Pay-
ment shall be made direct to lessor at the address shown in this lease, or at the option
of lessee, to the depository bank to which the annual delay rentals are to be paid, as
provided for in Paragraph - herein. The commencement of drilling or mining opera-
tions by the lessee herein, upon any part of the lands described herein, or upon acreage
with which this property has been pooled, shall not relieve said lessee, his successors or
assigns, of the obligation to pay the amount set forth above.
The rider contemplates that the top lessee will pay a portion of the bonus due upon execution of
the top lease. It subordinates the top lease to the rights of the bottom lessee under the terms of
the latter's lease. It provides for written notice and demand by the lessor upon termination of
the bottom lease. The rider then gives the top lessee a thirty-day option period to lease those
lands described in the lease that the top lessee has not previously (or during the option period)
released, by paying the remaining portion of the bonus due on a net mineral acre basis.
108. See mpra note 89.
109. Thus, if the bottom lessee drilled a dry hole on a portion of his lease, the top lessee
could, in effect, carve out the nonproductive acreage.
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terminates, without a further agreement from the bottom
lessee.
I. Make a good faith effort to determine whether the prior lease
has terminated or whether the primary term has been extended
by production or otherwise before entering onto the leased
premises to explore or drill under the top lease. Such effort
should include the following steps:
1. Title search, including, prior to drilling, an attor-
ney's title opinion; and,
2. A release from the prior lessee or, at least before
drilling, conclusive evidence that the prior lease
has expired, which will usually require proof of
nondevelopment as to all of the lands in the prior
lease and any lands with which any of such lands
have been pooled or unitized.
CONCLUSION
Legal authorities illuminate several features of top leases that are of sig-
nificant import to an oil and gas company engaged in the practice of top
leasing. The top lease must expressly recognize the existence of the prior
lease and be subject to it. Prior to entrance onto or possession of the leased
premises, the top lessee must be absolutely certain that the prior lease has
not been extended past its primary term by production, pooling, or other-
wise. Even if the primary term of the prior lease should have terminated
some years before the execution of the top lease, a top lessee may be a tres-
passer if he has actual or constructive notice that the prior lease is being held
by production.
In this regard, it is of paramount importance that the top lessee make a
good faith effort to determine whether the prior lease has in fact terminated,
whether the leased lands have been pooled with other lands, or whether the
prior lease is being held by production or otherwise. The top lessee should
conduct an independent title search and obtain an attorney's title opinion
before drilling. The top lessee should also conduct a surface examination.
The top lessee should obtain releases or, alternatively, assurances from the
lessor that the lessor has given notice and demand to the lessees or assignees
of any prior unreleased oil and gas leases. These would constitute the steps
that the top lessee must take to ensure the safety of his investment and to
shield him from liability to a bottom lessee.
In sum, an examination of the judicial decisions involving top leases
reveals that litigation can arise in a number of different circumstances.
From the legal perspective, there is much to be learned from the authority in
this area. As the practice of top leasing for oil and gas continues to prolifer-
ate, the top lessee who knows the law will stand a much better chance of
avoiding litigation.
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